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Animated Persona
The Ontological Status of a Deceased Person  
Who Continues to Appear in This World
In this paper, I propose the concept of the “animated persona,” a sound-
less voice that says, “I am here” and appears on the surface of someone 
or something. This concept can bring clarity to the experience of perceiv-
ing a kind of personhood on a corpse, a wooden mask, or even a tree. In 
the first half of this paper, I will examine some Japanese literature and a 
work of Viktor Frankl’s that discuss these phenomena. In the second half, 
I will analyze the concept of animated persona from five perspectives: (1) a 
compelling power, (2) surface-ness, (3) religious experience, (4) universal-
ity, and (5) the meaning of “I.” Lastly, I will discuss the relationship among 
the three layers of biological object, animated persona, and self-conscious 
being. My aim is to shed new light on the meaning of the encounter 
between the living and the dead.





Since the great East Japan earthquake of 2011, many tsunami victims who lost family members are reported to have encountered their loved ones 
in their homes, at the seashore, and in other nearby places. Some saw their 
images in living rooms, some heard their voices in the wind. From the per-
spective of modern science, these phenomena would be interpreted as delu-
sions brought about by overwhelming emotions over the tragedy of family 
members lost to the disaster. 
In this paper, I would like to propose a new philosophical framework to 
have another look at these phenomena, which occur to ordinary people in 
everyday settings, and offer an alternative explanation. In the first half of 
this paper, I will examine some of the literature that discusses these phe-
nomena from a philosophical point of view. In the second half, I will pro-
pose the concept of animated persona and attempt a phenomenological and 
ontological analysis of it. My discussion relies heavily on the writings of Jap-
anese authors, but I believe that the theory of the animated persona applies 
equally to a variety of phenomena experienced by ordinary people around 
the world. The central challenge of this paper is to examine how we might 
interpret the encounter between the living and the dead from the perspec-
tive of contemporary philosophy.
Conversations with a brain-dead body
It is interesting that even those who do not believe in the existence 
of a soul can have this kind of experience. For example, Yanagida Kunio 
(1936–), a well-known Japanese journalist with a rigorously scientific mind, 
acknowledged the experience of having “conversations” with his brain-dead, 
unconscious son Yōjirō in the hospital.
In his autobiographical memoir Gisei (Sacrifice), published in 1995, 
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Yanagida recounts his experience of sitting at the bedside of his brain-dead 
son, taking hold of the still warm hands and calling him by name as he remi-
nisced on their time together in life.
“My son’s body ‘converses’ with me without spoken language,” Yanagida 
wries. “This is a mysterious feeling.”1
Even though Yōjirō was brain-dead, when Ken’ichirō and I talked to his 
body, he “talked back” to us. This was a truly mysterious experience. Perhaps 
it is something that can be understood only by members of a family who have 
shared happiness and sorrows with each other. Despite the scientific evidence 
that a brain-dead person is literally a dead person who has no consciousness 
or use of the senses, I was convinced that the brain-dead body of our beloved 
held great meaning for those of his family who were joined by a living, spiri-
tual bond.2
This was a very strange experience for Yanagida, who had the strong feel-
ing that there was someone, some living person, in front of him, although 
his son was in the state of brain death, lying unconscious on a bed. As an 
objective observer, Yanagida clearly understood that a brain-dead patient 
has lost self-consciousness permanently, but as a father, he could not help 
noticing “a remnant of personhood” on his beloved son’s brain-dead body. 
We find similar narratives in the memoirs of any number of families of 
brain-dead patients. In an impressive memoir, the parents of a brain-dead 
daughter write vividly of their attempt to communicate with her. Her 
mother would put perfume on their daughter’s warm feet, and every time 
her father would leave the hospital room, he would call out to his daughter, 
“Gambariya (Hang in there)!” They understood that their daughter had 
lost self-consciousness in the state of brain death, but at the same time, they 
perceived a mysterious something on their daughter’s body. It was the over-
whelming power of that “something” that prompted them to act in this way.3
Another example is taken from a letter to a newspaper written by 
Watanabe Ryōko. She had requested that in the event she were to become 
brain dead, her organs were to be donated immediately. One day, her father 
fell into a deep coma (in his case, brain death was not diagnosed). She writes:
1. Yanagida 1995, 129.
2. Yanagida 1995, 129. Ken’ichirō was Yanagida’s first son.
3. Fujiwara 1993 , 21.
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To touch the body of my unconscious father and to feel its warmth is the 
sole dialogue between us at present. It is different in quality from everyday 
communication through words and expressions. As I do so, I feel my sensitiv-
ity broaden and deepen limitlessly. I soothe myself and make preparations for 
the inevitable parting with my father.
It may be that my father’s warmth heals me. His present condition may go 
against his will, but it is of great significance for those of us who keep holding 
his hands in ours.
I myself wish to be an organ donor. But having gone through this experi-
ence, I have come to think that I should forgive my family if they wish to 
share my warmth for as long as possible—for a day, or even for just an hour. 
Just as things are with my father now.4
What is most impressive about these narratives is that those who recount 
them believed that a dialogue or conversation without spoken language had 
taken place between a brain-dead person (or a person in a deep coma) and 
their family members. Scientifically, it makes no sense to claim that one can 
converse with someone who is unconscious. But then, who were the family 
members talking with?
Watsuji’s concept of persona
Let us now turn to the important Japanese philosopher Watsuji 
Tetsurō (1889–1960). In his essay “Mask and Persona,” published in 1935,5 
Watsuji talks about the Japanese Nō play and its relationship to the idea of 
persona, a Latin word that originally referred to the “mask” worn by an actor.
An actor in a Nō play dances on stage while wearing a mask. Watsuji 
remarks that, by itself, the mask looks like the face of someone who has died 
a sudden death, but once worn, it becomes expressive like the face of a living 
person. The bodily movements of the actor seem to breathe “life” into the 
dead mask and allow it to show various emotions of a living person. What 
at first appears to be a death mask is gradually transformed into a thing of 
beauty through the dance of the actor until at last it seems to sparkle with 
life. In the dreamlike illusion of a mugen Nō (夢幻能), the protagonist is a 
4. Watanabe 1997; emphasis added. For further examples, see Kinjō and Morioka 2011.
5. Watsuji 1935.
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departed soul wandering the world, and it is on his mask that the soul alights 
to restore life to the deceased. The mask is the point at which life and death 
intersect in the one who has died.
Watsuji identifies two phases occurring on the Nō stage. In the first, the 
actor’s bodily movements breathe “life” into the mask he is wearing. At this 
point, the mask is being controlled by the dance and gestures of the actor’s 
bodily movement. This is followed by a second phase in which the Nō mask, 
which the actor has made to come “alive,” becomes the locus of personhood 
and begins to control the body and limbs of the dancer as if they were its 
own. In the first phase, the actor is the subject of the body; in the second, 
the mask takes over as subject. This conversion of actor and mask is one of 
the most impressive parts of Watsuji’s argument.
A Nō mask on its own lacks any self-consciousness or rationality. It is 
nothing more than a wood carving. But no sooner is it worn by an actor 
performing in front of an audience than it takes on personhood and begins 
to govern the whole body of the actor. Watsuji calls what appears on the 
surface of the mask “persona.”6 It is not the inner personality of the actor, 
but rather a mysterious something that emerges from the interaction 
among the protagonist, the other actors, the audience, the story line, and 
the music.
Watsuji’s theory of persona as outlined above suggests that even a wooden 
mask, devoid of self-consciousness and rationality, becomes a kind of person 
when animated by an actor’s movement or some other force. I propose to 
call this type of personhood animated persona. In doing so, I am fully aware 
that such an idea contradicts the modern European concept of person as a 
self-conscious subject equipped with free will and the power of reason.7
6. Watsuji writes, “The mask or face has a central significance for human existence. It is not 
only a part of the body, but also the locus of the subject that governs its body, that is to say, 
the locus of personhood. All things considered, it is very natural here to imagine (the word) 
persona” (Watsuji 1935, 21.) Here he himself writes the word “persona” in Latin, and later in 
katakana.
7. Two years later, in 1937, Watsuji published the first volume of his Ethics, where he system-
atically discussed the concept of person in the opening chapter, where the idea of the animated 
persona is present in germ. For example, Watsuji writes that when we go to meet up with a 
friend, we never try to find a body that resembles our friend, and then try to find our friend in 
that body. However, he does not proceed here to a discussion of the animated persona, which for 
some reason I cannot fathom he seems to have kept separate from his philosophical system of 
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I would argue that the mysterious “something” that made its presence 
felt on the body of Yanagida’s brain-dead son is none other than the ani-
mated persona Watsuji identified on the Nō mask. I am also persuaded what 
many authors who write about the relationship between the living and the 
dead mean by “the deceased” also falls under the definition of the animated 
persona.
An animated persona appearing on a Nō mask (Watsuji) and an ani-
mated persona appearing on the body of a brain-dead patient (Yanagida) 
should not be considered merely an illusion or projection. It is something 
actually perceived by the audience or the family members. Of course, this 
does not commit us to believe in the soul as an entity present in the corpse, 
on the surface of a mask, or somewhere in one’s imagination. We cannot 
directly see, touch, or hear an animated persona as such, but we can per-
ceive its appearance with our whole body and communicate with it with-
out spoken language. In other words, the animated persona is a “soundless 
voice” that can be heard by those with a special relationship to a deceased 
person in a state of brain death, or by an audience deeply immersed in a 
Nō drama being enacted before them. The message of that soundless voice 
is simply “I am here.” This is the essence of the appearance of an ani-
mated persona. 
Viktor frankl and the animated persona
The phenomenon of the animated persona is hardly unique to 
Japan or other cultures where an animistic worldview seems to have survived 
the test of time in a large portion of the population. I would point out simi-
lar descriptions in Viktor Frankl’s masterpiece Man’s Search for Meaning.8
In the concentration camp, where he was forced into hard labor, Frankl 
remembers the image of his beloved wife, who had been sent to another 
camp and of whom he does not know whether or not she is still alive:
Ethics. For my part, the idea of an animated persona is more attractive than the idea of person 
discussed in his Ethics, especially when it comes to the relationship between the living and the 
dead. See Watsuji 1937, 99.
8. Frankl 2011.
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I resumed talk with my loved one: I asked her questions, and she answered; 
she questioned me in return, and I answered.… A thought crossed my mind: 
I didn’t even know if she were still alive. I knew only one thing—which I 
have learned well by now: Love goes very far beyond the physical person 
of the beloved. It finds its deepest meaning in his [the beloved person’s] 
spiritual being, his inner self.9 Whether or not he [the beloved person] is 
actually present,10 whether or not he is still alive at all, ceases somehow to be 
of importance…. There was no need for me to know; nothing could touch 
the strength of my love, my thoughts, and the image of my beloved. Had 
I known then that my wife was dead, I think that I would still have given 
myself, undisturbed by that knowledge, to the contemplation for her image, 
and that my mental conversation with her11 would have been just as vivid and 
just as satisfying.…12
Once again I communed with my beloved. More and more I felt that she 
was present, that she was with me; I had the feeling that I was able to touch 
her, able to stretch out my hand and grasp hers. The feeling was very strong: 
she was there [sie – ist – da!].13
Frankl’s experience of conversing with his beloved wife and feeling that 
she is in his presence is an impressive example of the appearance of an ani-
mated persona in sense I have just described.
Frankl also writes of a young woman who is set to die shortly:
This young woman knew that she would die in the next few days.… Pointing 
through the window of the hut, she said, “This tree here is the only friend I 
have in my loneliness.”… “I often talk to this tree,” she said to me.… Anxiously 
I asked her if the tree replied. “Yes.” What did it say to her? She answered, “It 
said to me, ‘I am here [ich bin da] – I am here – I am life, eternal life.’”14
Here, too, Frankl talks about an animated persona, a soundless voice that 
announces, “I am here”—this time through a tree. I am struck by the fact 
that the young woman uses the words “I am here (ich bin da).” She may or 
9. “das geistige Wesen des geliebten Menschen, sein ‘So-sein.’” 
10. “seine körperliche Existenz.” 
11. “diese geistige Zwiesprache.”
12. Frankl 2011, 31; German, 64–5.
13. Frankl 2011, 33; German, 68.
14. Frankl 2011, 56, German: p. 107. “Er hat mir gesagt: Ich bin da – ich – bin – da – ich bin 
das Leben, das ewige Leben….”
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may not have heard that voice as an actual sound wave, but she believed 
she could perceive an animated persona actually appearing on the tree. This 
would seem to indicate that not only a deceased person but also a God or 
spirit can appear as an animated persona. If so, the range of the concept of 
animated persona is broader than we at first thought.
Because Frankl was a Jewish thinker, it may seem misleading to speak 
of him as having perceived an “animated” persona. Nonetheless, I believe 
his case is a clear indication of how people throughout history can experi-
ence such phenomena irrespective of time and place; it is a truly universal 
experience.
Interaction between the living and the deceased
Before moving on to a philosophical analysis of the animated 
persona, I would like to take up other discussions in Japanese philosophi-
cal literature on the interaction between the living and the dead.
The philosopher Tanabe Hajime (1885–1962) wrote in an essay entitled 
“An Ontology of Life or a Dialectics of Death?” that living persons can com-
municate with the deceased and establish an “existential cooperation” with 
them.15 Tanabe argued that the love of the deceased toward the living per-
son and of the living toward the deceased resonate in a mutual “existential 
cooperation” of love that amounts to a “resurrection from death.”16 He calls 
it “a cooperative sympathy through mutual love between the living and the 
dead.”17 What is unique about Tanabe’s thinking here is that he believed 
that the living and the dead can actually communicate with each other in 
this world, reminiscent of conversations between brain-dead patients and 
the members of their family. He argues that cooperative sympathy involves, 
first, a catharsis of the deceased and then, secondly, a purification of the liv-
ing under the influence of the deceased. This suggests that the starting point 
is the deceased, not the living.
Tanabe’s concept of “existential cooperation” is echoed in the historian 
Uehara Senroku’s (1899–1975) book The Living and the Dead. Uehara writes 
15. 実存協同, Tanabe 1958, 245.
16. 死復活, Tanabe 1958, 293.
17. 死者生者の交互愛における協同感応, Tanabe 1958, 294.
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that he actually felt the continued existence of his late wife when he sat in 
front of her Buddhist memorial tablet.18 It was “a presence that is not dead 
in spite of having already died.”19
Uehara then came to think that he actually existed with his late wife, lived 
with her, and fought social injustice with her. He calls this “a co-existence, 
co-living, and co-struggling that goes on between the deceased and the 
living.”20 He appended a special chapter to the book to expose what he saw 
as the medical misconduct his wife suffered while hospitalized. The chapter 
was written as a result of their joint struggles against injustice in which his 
wife had been the leading figure, so that it was the deceased and not the liv-
ing who was passing judgment. It is also worth noting that in the course of 
this confrontation he could actually hear his late wife’s voice at times. Fur-
thermore, he was persuaded that it was the deceased and not the living who 
initiated the communication between the living and the dead.
The critic Wakamatsu Eisuke (1963–) also speaks of the presence of his 
late wife and refers to her ontological status as “the living dead.”21 In his 
words, “The deceased accompany us. They actually feel pain, grieve, feel 
sorrow, and rejoice with us.”22 For Wakamatsu, the deceased have their own 
inner emotions: 
The deceased always exist side by side with the living, and have to look at the 
face of the living who are weeping over them. The deceased also feel the liv-
ing in the midst of their sorrow. The sorrow indicates a cooperation taking 
place between the living and the deceased.23
All three authors mentioned above believe that they have had actual 
interactions with a deceased person. In my view, their accounts can be inter-
preted as examples of the animated personae I have been discussing in these 
pages.
18. Uehara 1988, 40.
19. Uehara 1988, 16.
20. Uehara 1988, 3.
21. 生ける死者, Wakamatsu 2012, 7.
22. Wakamatsu 2012, 221.
23. Wakamatsu 2012, 222. In his book, he discusses the philosophies of death in Frankl, 
Tanabe, and Uehara. I consulted his work frequently in composing this paper.
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A philosophical analysis of the animated persona
The concept of animated persona as I am describing it differs from 
the concept of persona as understood in mainstream European philosophy, 
which requires self-consciousness, free will, and rationality as necessary con-
ditions for identifying a person. In a word, I would define animated persona 
as “a soundless voice saying I am here’ that appears on the surface of something 
or someone.” Based on the brief explanation given above, I would now like to 
consider some salient characteristics of the animated persona in more detail. 
1. A compelling power and the reaction to it
A striking feature of the animated persona is that it has a compelling power 
to make the one who perceives it react in some fashion. Sitting alongside his 
brain-dead son, Yanagida unintentionally began “conversations” with him, 
and Frankl, perceiving the appearance of his wife in the air, began “conversa-
tions” with her. 
Once a voice that makes no sound has come to me, it is difficult to ignore 
it or erase it from my mind. An animated persona’s compelling power forces 
me to react to the voice in some way. Whence does this power arise? One 
possible explanation is that the ultimate cause is located outside the body 
or object in which the animated persona is thought to reside. For example, 
in the case of the brain-dead son, the ultimate cause would lie in the father’s 
overwhelming emotions, or in the case of the wooden mask, in the move-
ments of the actor and the setting of the play. 
That said, if we put ourselves in the position of the perceiver, the situa-
tion changes dramatically. We may describe it as follows: In the first case, 
the appearance of an animated persona in the brain-dead body of the son 
was followed by a reaction to the soundless voice emerging from it. In the 
second case, the appearance of an animated persona on the wooden mask in 
the course of a beautiful dance moved the audience.
From the position of a detached bystander, then, we see things one way; 
from the position of the actual perceiver, we see them another. Here I have 
been taking the second standpoint, obliging me to pay special attention to 
the latter perspective: an animated persona appears first on the surface of 
someone or something, which triggers the perceiver to recognize its appear-
ance and react to it. We recall that Tanabe and Uehara emphasize that the 
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starting point of the communication between the living and the dead is in 
the dead, not the living. 
2. The surface-ness of an animated persona
An animated persona appears on the surface of a body or an object. In the 
case of the brain-dead patient, the soundless voice comes from the surface of 
the brain-dead body, not from within. The place that emits the voice is the 
surface, not the interior.
Here we need to make a “Copernican revolution.” As moderns, we are 
inclined to think that what is most essential about a human being is hid-
den beneath the surface. We tend to think that our inner character is more 
important than our exterior appearance or behavior. When it comes to the 
animated persona, however, the reverse is true. An animated persona appears 
only on the surface of the object. The animated persona originates from the 
surface. It is impossible for it to exist inside something.
For an animated persona, what appears on the surface is everything. There 
is nothing that is hidden inside. The essence of the animated persona and 
what gives it its ontological status is its surface-ness.24 
Husserl’s concept of other minds is different from the concept of ani-
mated persona being proposed here. When Levinas talks about “the face,” he 
views it as the trace of the advent of “the Other,” which is destined to escape 
from my every endeavor to grasp it. But here, too, Levinas’s “Other” differs 
from the animated persona, even though his concept of “face” shares with 
the animated persona its attention to the surface. Moreover, in our experi-
ence of an animated persona, there is no delay in Levinas’s sense. The sound-
less voice reaches me simultaneously with my perception of the animated 
persona. In the future I plan to return to a more detailed analysis of the dif-
ference between animated persona and these kinds of phenomenological 
concepts, giving special attention to the relationship between the percep-
tible and the imperceptible.
Where might an animated persona appear? It appears on the surface 
of something, but it can also appear in the wind, in my memory, or in my 
imagination. In each case, animated personae do not occupy a physical place. 
This suggests that there are two kinds of animated persona: those that have a 
24. Surface-ness does not entail shallowness; it can have depth.
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physical place and those that do not. The question then arises as to whether 
an animated persona that occupies no physical place can be said to appear on 
the surface of something. This is complicated, but in the case of an animated 
persona that appears in memory, we may say that it appears on the surface of 
memory because there is no “inside” to memory. The same applies to imagi-
nation. This, too, calls for further investigation.
3. The resemblance to religious experience
Each time I perceive the appearance of an animated persona, I hear a sound-
less “I am here” emerge from the animated persona. This is not unlike what 
we call religious experience. 
There are numerous accounts of people hearing the voice of God or 
spirits without the use of their auditory organs. Frankl’s second example is 
instructive here. The young woman heard the voice of God proclaim, “I am 
here” when looking at a tree outside her window. This is a typical religious 
experience of encounter with the divine, but it is also quite similar to the 
experience of perceiving an animated persona on the body of a brain-dead 
family member or on a Nō mask.
In this sense, we may say that the perception of God or spirits and the per-
ception of an animated persona share an important characteristic, namely, 
that while I do not see, hear, or touch anything clearly, I am able to directly 
perceive with my body as a whole a soundless voice telling me, “I am here.” 
This perception is so real that it is almost impossible for me to doubt the 
truthfulness of the presence of an animated persona. In the Spanish movie 
Marcelino, pan y vino (1955), the protagonist, a boy called Marcelino, sees 
an apparition of Jesus on a crucifix hanging on the wall of a monastery cell, 
reaching out to gently take hold of the boy’s body. From the boy’s perspec-
tive, he hears the voice of Jesus and sees the movement of the arm. In the 
movie the movement of Jesus’s arm and his voice are beautifully depicted 
to show something that actually occurred in the boy’s subjective perception 
at that moment, but I would suggest that it is an artistic visualization of the 
boy’s encounter with a soundless voice telling him, “I am here.” 
Strange as it may seem, this may further suggest that the very act of 
encountering someone might itself be a kind of religious experience. That 
is to say, each time I encounter a human being and perceive an animated 
persona on that body, I am swept up in a religious experience in the midst 
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of everyday life. As will I discuss later, we can perceive an animated persona 
not only on dead bodies, but also on living human bodies and other material 
objects. When I see a friend in the classroom, I can hear the soundless voice 
that says, “I am here” on the body of that friend. Everyday experience may 
well be filled with small religious experiences like this. Meeting someone, in 
essence, is a kind of a religious event.
4. The universality of the animated persona
Is the appearance of an animated persona on another’s body an objective or a 
subjective event? If subjective, we have to say that it is a phenomenon pecu-
liar to the subject who perceives it and hence lacks universality.
For example, a brain-dead patient may appear as an animated persona 
to family members, but may not appear as such to a hospital doctor or a 
bystander. In this case, we can say that the appearance of an animated per-
sona is a particular subjective phenomenon and not a universal one. This is 
the reason the animated persona is often dismissed as an illusion or projec-
tion. While I disagree with the conclusion, I have to admit that animated 
persona seems to lack universality.
For some, an animated persona is an irreplaceable reality; for others, it is 
nothing more than a subjective phenomenon limited to those close to the 
subject. An animated persona is not an external object open to everyone to 
see or touch or smell. Its appearance is restricted to a select group of people. 
This does not necessarily mean that an animated persona is not important, 
or without value. When the family member of a brain-dead patient per-
ceives an animated persona on the patient’s body, the appearance is invalu-
able and irreplaceable to the perceiver. There is no cause to heartlessly negate 
the experience. On the contrary, we have every reason to respect and protect 
the experience even when it cannot be shared. This must be our basic moral 
attitude toward those who undergo the experience of an the animated per-
sona in someone close to them.25
Imagine a sacred statue revered by a certain religious group. Most if not 
all of the believers are able to perceive a certain kind of animated persona 
on the surface of the statue, perhaps because their teachings or beliefs lead 
25. This is what I argued in my book Brain Dead Person published in 1991. An English trans-
lation is available for download on the internet.
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them to accept it as sacred. In this case, we may say that an animated per-
sona appearing on the statue has universality within the confines of the reli-
gious community. But now, what if this religious group spreads rapidly until 
almost everyone on earth has become an ardent believer? Then, perhaps, we 
may speak of the animated persona of the statue as having attained universal-
ity, even if some continue to dismiss it as an illusion. Theoretically speak-
ing, it is sometimes hard to distinguish collectively held subjective beliefs 
from what we consider to be objective reality. This opens the possibility of a 
subjective universality in addition to our usually objective understanding of 
universality.
5. What is “I” in the “I am here”?
The Animated persona, as we have been saying, implies a soundless voice 
announcing its presence. What are we to make of the “I” in the phrase “I 
am here”? In my view, the “I” stands for the subject that appears on the 
surface of a body or an object, not the subject that exists within the body or 
the object. 
Then, what exactly can such a surface “I” mean? I have not yet made up 
my mind on this question, but my sense is that this “I” signals the “starting 
point” of the voice. In other words, the soundless voice comes into being at 
that point, which the perceiver regards as a subject, an “I” that can deliver 
messages to others. When I perceive an animated persona on the surface of a 
body or an object, what I perceive is a soundless voice emitted from the body 
or the object, and I think of the “I” in this voice as the starting point of a 
trajectory that reaches me as its end.
I cannot intentionally control where and when this starting point makes 
itself manifest. In this sense, it transcends the realm of my control. This 
means that the advent of the starting point, which can also be named the 
advent of the “I,” resembles the advent of “the Other” in Levinas’s sense. Ear-
lier I noted that Levinas’s idea of “the Other” differs from my idea of the 
animated persona, but I would now add that the “I” perceived as the start-
ing point of the soundless voice could also be considered another name for 
“the Other.” The question then arises as whether there was anything there 
before the starting point. Did it appear ex nihilo or was there something or 
someone who prepared the way for the voice? I leave this question for future 
research.
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Conclusion
Up to this point I have centered my remarks mainly on the con-
cept of animated persona as a kind of personhood appearing on the corpse 
of a brain-dead patient, on someone fallen into a coma, or on the surface of 
a mask. But this concept can also be applied to living human beings and to 
other non-living objects, like robots and dolls.
Say I enter a classroom and find one of my friends there. She smiles at me 
and I say hello to her. Why did I say hello to her? The reason is that I noticed 
someone who can have a conversation with me. But why did I think that she 
was such a person? Because when I caught sight of my friend, I perceived 
an animated persona on the surface of her body. The reason was not that I 
noticed a human being equipped with self-consciousness inside her body. 
She might actually have turned out to be a well-engineered robot without 
any self-consciousness at all.
And what of Watsuji’s example of the Nō player? Clearly the members of 
the audience do not believe that the wooden mask has some kind of inner 
self-consciousness. Still, they are able to perceive the appearance of an ani-
mated persona on the surface of the wooden mask. In short, the appearance 
of an animated persona is independent of any belief about the presence of 
self-consciousness behind the mask.
All of this leads to the hypothesis of three layers of perception that can be 
applied to any object, human beings included. First is the layer of the bio-
logical object. Second is the layer of the animated persona. And third is the 
layer of the self-conscious being.
For example, a friend sitting opposite me is a biological object, but also 
appears as an animated persona and is someone I consider to be self-con-
scious. In the case of the Nō actor, the mask is not a biological object (it is 
made of a piece of wood) and while it nevertheless appears as an animated 
persona to the audience, it is not considered a self-conscious being.
Animated persona is not just another name for the soul or spirit of a dead 
person. It is a layer that can be found as well in living human beings as in 
brain-dead human beings, and in inanimate masks and mementos. It is also 
interesting to imagine whether we can perceive an animated persona on the 
surface of a well-engineered robot. Theoretically, an animated persona could 
indeed appear there as well as on any inanimate doll.
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This suggests that our theory of the animated persona could have impli-
cations on robotic studies and AI research which has begun to question 
whether robots could be engineered to such a level of ai that they might 
be regarded as a true person. In any event, we are driven to reconsider just 
what it is that constitutes personhood. As for myself, I am inclined to take 
the possibility seriously and not dismiss it simply on the grounds that some-
thing lacks a “human soul.”
Finally, I would like to add a brief comment on an animated persona 
and the process of human death. Futuristic discussions aside, I accept as 
fact that an animated persona can appear distinctly on the body of a per-
son approaching death or who has just passed away. My reasoning is as fol-
lows. When someone is still alive, even though I perceive their animated 
persona, the power of linguistic communication overshadows it. But when 
that same person is approaching death or has already died, communication 
through language disappears and in its place the presence of their animated 
persona suddenly looms large. To use a well-known analogy, the sun and 
the stars are all out in the daytime, but the light of the sun blocks out that 
of the stars. Only when the sun has set do the stars that were there all along 
begin to shine for us. 
The appearance of an animated persona becomes most visible in the star-
light that the darkness of death brings with it. Just then, for the first time, 
am I able to notice the animated persona appear and to hear the tiny sound-
less voice that says, “I am here.”
*  This paper was presented as a keynote speech at the 5th Conference of the European 
Network of Japanese Philosophy held at Nanzan University, Nagoya, on 31 August 
2019. I would like to express my deepest gratitude to the organizers of the conference 
and the participants who asked me helpful questions.
The work was supported by a “Kakenhi” Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research 
20k00042, 17h00828, and 20h01175. 
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